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1ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study a resource allocation problem of economies with many com-
modities and single-peaked preferences.It is known that the uniform rule is the unique
allocation mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto eﬃciency and anonymity,i f
the number of good is only one and pereferences are single-peaked.(Sprumont [7]. )
However, if the number of goods is greater than one, the situation drastically changes
and a tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and strategy-proofness arises.The generalized uniform
rule in multiple-commodity settings is still starategy-proof, but not Pareto eﬃcient in
general.In this paper, we show that in a class of all strategy-proof mechanisms the
generalized uniform rule is a ”second best” strategy-proof mechanism in that there is
no other strategy-proof mechanism which gives a ”better” outcome than the generalized
uniform rule in terms of Pareto domination.
21 Introduction
Starting from Sprumont’s [7] remarkable paper, resource allocation in economies with
single-peaked preferences has been studied by many authors.Sprumont [7] presented a
beautiful characterization of a resource allocation mechanism which satisﬁes the three ax-
ioms of strategy-proofness (SP), anonymity (AN), and Pareto optimality (PO).Strategy-
proofness means that telling a true preference is dominant strategy for all agents in a
game of stating their preferences.Anonymity says the mechanism should be indepen-
dent of ”names” of agents.Pareto optimalty requires any allocations obtained by the
mechanism must be Pareto optimal with respect to reported preference relations.
Sprumont proposes a resource allocation mechanism called the uniform rule.Under
the uniform rule the same amount of a single divisible good is basically alloted to everyone
except people whose peaks are small enough if excess demand exists or large enough if
excess supply exists.He proved that if preferences are single-peaked, the uniform rule is
the unique allocation mechanism satisfying SP, AN and PO.
Sprumont’s theorem essentially depends on the assumption that there is only one
commodity.If the number of goods is greater than one, the natural extension of the uni-
form rule may not sastisfy Pareto optimality.Following Amoros [1], we call this extension
the generalized uniform rule.Assignment of goods under the generalized uniform rule is
done by applying repeatedly the single good uniform rule commodity by commodity.
It is easy to show that the generalized uniform rule sastisﬁes strategy-proofness.(See
Amoros [1].) 1 However, as shown in Example 1.1 below, the rule does not satisfy Pareto
optimality.
Example 1.1 There are two agents and two goods.Let K1 and K2 be the amounts of
goods 1 and 2 to be allocated.A rectangle of Figure 1 is an Edgeworth Box.In Figure
1, p∗1 and p∗2 designate the peaks of Mr.1 and Mr. 2’s preferences, respectively.The
middle point M of a rectangle is an allocation point where the equal amounts of goods
are alloted for each good.Since for each good i =1 ,2, both of them have peaks greater
than Ki/2, the generalized uniform rule assigns the equal amounts of goods to both
agents.This allocation is given by M.However, if indiﬀerence curves of both agents at
M can be drawn like Figure 1, both of them may have room for improving their welfare.
(For example, A is better than M for both agents.) So, M is not Pareto optimal.
The literature on strategy-proofness in economic environments has uncovered a ten-
sion between strategy-proofness and Pareto eﬃciency.For example, Hurwicz [2] shows
that in pure exchange economies, there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-eﬃcient, and indi-
vidually rational rule if there are two agents and two goods.Zhou [8] proves that in pure
exchange economies, there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-eﬃcient, and non-dictatorial rule
if the number of agens is two and the number of goods is greater than or equal to two. 2
Example 1.1 suggests that the same kind of a tradeoﬀ between strategy-proofness and
eﬃciency may exist in economies with single-peaked preferences and many commodities.
Indeed, Amoros [1] shows that in economies with single-peaked preferences a strategy
1It also satisﬁes anonymity.
2See also Ohseto [4], Serizawa [5], Kato and Ohseto [3] and Serizawa and Weymark [6].
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proof and eﬃcient mechanism must be dictatorial if the number of agents is two and
the number of goods is greater than or equal to two. 3 This theorem extends the
impossibility theorems of Hurwicz’s [2] or Zhou’s [8].One way of escaping this kind of a
tradeoﬀ is to drop or replace an axiom.In fact Amoros [1] resolved the diﬃculty along
this line.That is, he replaced eﬃciency with an axiom of one-sidedness. 4 His main
theorem says that if the number of agents is two and the number of goods is greater
than or equal to two, the generalized uniform rule is the unique allocation mechanism
satisfying envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and one-sidedness. 5 Since one-sidedness is
a straightforward extension of Sprumont’s eﬃciency concept, 6 Amoros’ characterization
theorems may be understood as a multiple-good version of Sprumont’s characterization.
In the present paper, we study a problem concerning eﬃciency and strategy-proofness
in a multiple-good setup from a much diﬀerent point of view.Since the tradeoﬀ between
3Amoros [1] Theorem 1.
4This axiom requires that for each good, the amounts of the good received by everyone is located on
the same side of his own peak. That is, for each good, if the quantity of the good received by an agent is
greater than or equal to his own peak amount, then the quantities of the good received by the remaining
people should be greater than or equal to their own peak amounts, and vice versa. If the number of good
is one, the one-sidedness is equivalent to Pareto optimality. However, the number of good is greater than
one, the one-sidedness does not necessarily imply the Pareto optimality. Amoros [1] called the axiom
Condition E (CE).
5Amoros [1] Theorem 2. In his Theorem 3, he replaces the envy-freeness with the weak anonymity.
6As noted in footnote 4, one-sidedness is equivalent to Pareto optimality if the number of good is
one. In [7], Sprumont assumed Pareto optimalty because some properties of one-sidedness are required
in his proof. Hence, in multiple-good economies, only one-sidedness is required for extending Sprumont’s
characterization.
4eﬃciency and strategy-proofness is inevitable in this setup, we are only interested in
a class of strategy-proof mechanisms.Our fundamental question in this research is as
follows: is there an ”upper bound” on eﬃciency among all strategy proof mechanisms?
Alternatively, what is a strategy-proof rule which cannot be Pareto-dominated by any
other strategy-proof rules?
Although the ﬁnal goal of this research is to ﬁnd a general upper bound of eﬃciency
in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms, as the ﬁrst step of the research we will show
that such an upper bound does exist.Indeed, the generalized uniform rule is a most
eﬃcient strategy-proof mechanism in terms of Pareto domination.
More precisely, our main theorem is that there is no other strategy-proof mechanism
whose outcome Pareto-dominates the outcome obtained by the generalized uniform rule.
This paper consists of ﬁve sections.In Section 2, the model is constructed and the
main theorem is presented.In Section 3, the proof of the main theorem is intuitively
described.In Section 4, the proof of the main theorem is given.In Section 5, we conclude
the paper by presenting some open questions and conjectures.
2 The Model and the Result
There are 2 agents and m commodities (m =1 ,2,...).Let N = {1,2} be the set of agents
and J = {1,2,...,m} be the set of commodities.For any i ∈ J, let Ki be the quantity of
the i-th commodity supplied.Let K =( K1,K 2,...,Km).Let 7
B =





i = Ki for all i ∈ J

.
B is the set of all feasible allocations.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A preference relation 8 R deﬁned on Rm
+ is single-peaked, if there is
p∗ ∈ Rm
+ such that for all x,x  ∈ Rm
+ with x  = x , if for all i ∈ J, either p∗
i ≥ xi ≥ x 
i or
x 
i ≥ xi ≥ p∗
i is true, then xPx , where xPx  means xRx  but not x Rx.
Let Γ be the class of all single-peaked preferences on Rm
+.For any R ∈ Γ, let p(R) denote
the peak of R and for all i ∈ J, pi(R) is the i-th component of p(R).
Deﬁnition 2.2 A solution is a mapping Ψ : Γ2 → B.
For all (R1,R 2) ∈ Γ2 and all k ∈ N, let Ψk(R1,R 2) be the consumption vector alloted
to the k−th agent in Ψ(R1,R 2).
Deﬁnition 2.3 A solution Ψ is strategy-proof (SP), if for all (R1,R 2) ∈ Γ2,




+ is the set of all m−dimensional nonnegative vectors.
8A complete, reﬂexive and transitive binary relation is called a preference relation.
5Ψ2( ˜ R1,R 2)R2Ψ( ˜ R1, ˜ R2) for all ( ˜ R1, ˜ R2) ∈ Γ2,
Deﬁnition 2.4 An allocation x =( x1,x 2) ∈ B is Pareto optimal for (R1,R 2) ∈ Γ2,i f
there is it no ˜ x ∈ B such that
˜ xkRkxk for all k ∈ N
˜ xk0Pk0xk0 for some k0 ∈ N
Deﬁnition 2.5 A solution Ψ is Pareto optimal (PO), if for all R ∈ Γ2, the allocation
Ψ(R) is Pareto Optimal for R ∈ Γ2.
Deﬁnition 2.6 The generalized uniform rule is the mapping U :Γ 2 → B that selects
for all R =( R1,R 2) ∈ Γ2 and all i ∈ J, the allocation x ∈ B such that
(1) if
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(2) if Ki ≥
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The following proposition is owing to Amoros [1] (Proposition 1).
Proposition 2.1 The generalized uniform rule satisﬁes strategy-proofness.
Our main theorem is the following.
Theorem 2.2 Let Ψ be any strategy-proof solution on Γ2.If
Ψk(R)RkUk(R) for all R =( R1,R 2) ∈ Γ2 and all k ∈ N,
then Ψ(R)=U(R) for all R ∈ Γ2.
3 Intuitive Explanation of the Proof of the Main Theorem
Although the formal proof of the main theorem is given in the next section, we explain
how to prove it intuitively in this section.Consider economies with two people and two
goods.To prove the theorem, suppose the contrary.Then, there is a strategy-proof
solution Ψ : Γ2 → B such that
Ψk(R)RkUk(R) for all R =( R1,R 2) ∈ Γ2 and for all k ∈ N
and
Ψ(R∗)  = U(R∗) for some R∗ =( R∗1,R ∗2) ∈ Γ2.
Let p∗1 = p(R∗1) and p∗2 = p(R∗2).Let us assume that p∗1 and p∗2 are located as in
Figure 2.In this case, there are excess demands for both goods and for all k ∈ N and all
6i ∈ J, p∗k
i >K i/2.This means that for both agents, their demands are large enough for
both commodities.Hence, the generalized uniform rule assigns the point M of Figure 2.
M is the equal allocation point for both goods.Let A =Ψ ( R∗).Note that A  = M.
We construct a new single-peaked preference relation ˜ R2 for Mr.2. Indiﬀerence curves
of ˜ R2 are circles with center A.Consider an economy with preference proﬁle ( R∗1, ˜ R2).
Let us ﬁnd an allocation assigned by the generalized uniform rule.In the market of
the ﬁrst good, since excess demand exists and both agents have large demand exceeding
K1/2, both of them receive equal amounts.In the market for the second good, excess
demand still prevails.However, since Mr. 2’s demand is less than K2/2, the amount of
good 2 he receives is equal to his Walrasian demand given by the peak of the preference
relation ˜ R2.Hence, the allocation assigned by the uniform rule is the point B of Figure
3.
Since Ψ(R∗1, ˜ R2) assigns an allocation which is better than or indiﬀerent to B for
each agent, Ψ(R∗1, ˜ R2) must be located in the shaded area of Figure 3.Since A is the
peak of ˜ R2, every point in this shaded area is worse than A for Mr.2. Hence, when Mr.
1 reports R∗1, Mr.2 has an incentive to tell a lie according to his preference ˜ R2.That
is, Mr.2 will be better oﬀ in terms of his preference ˜ R2, if he reports R∗2 instead of his
true preference ˜ R2.This contradicts strategy-proofness.
So far, we have shown that the main theorem is true if peaks of the preference relations
R∗1 and R∗2 are located as in Figure 2.To complete the proof, we need to check the
remaining possibilities for the location of the peaks, but the intuitive idea for the proof
is essentially the same.In the next section, we give a formal proof of the theorem in the
two-agent and m good case.
Figure 2:
7Figure 3:
4 Proof of the Theorem
In this section, we prove Theorem 2.2. We argue by contradiction. Suppose that there
is a strategy-proof solution Ψ : Γ2 → B such that
Ψk(R)RkUk(R) for all R =( R1,R 2) ∈ Γ2 and for all k ∈ N
and
Ψ(R∗)  = U(R∗) for some R∗ =( R∗1,R ∗2) ∈ Γ2.
Let x∗ =( x∗1,x ∗2)=Ψ ( R∗),d=( d1,d 2)=U(R∗),p ∗1 = p(R∗1) and p∗2 = p(R∗2).
Since x∗1 + x∗2 = K =( K1,K 2,...,Km), Ψ(R∗)  = U(R∗) implies that x∗1  = d1 and
x∗2  = d2.Since x∗ Pareto-dominates d by assumption, x∗1R∗1d1 and x∗2R∗2d2 must
hold.






i )2 for all x2 ∈ Rm
+
Note that p( ˜ R2)=x∗2.If m = 2, the indiﬀerence curves of ˜ R2 are circles with center
x∗2.
Let y∗ =( y∗1,y∗2)=U(R∗1, ˜ R2).
Lemma 4.1 y∗1R∗1x∗1.














First, we show that y∗1(1)R∗1x∗1.To this end, note that by the deﬁnition of the







1 , this is obvious because y∗1(1) = x∗1.If y∗1
1 = p∗1


















1 = K1/2, there are two possibilities: (a) K1/2 ≥ p∗1
1 and K1/2 ≥ x∗2
1 , and
(b) p∗1
1 ≥ K1/2 and x∗2
1 ≥ K1/2.








1 (1) ≥ x∗1
1 .
For all j ∈ J with j  = 1, either
x∗1
j = y∗1
j (1) ≥ p∗1
j or p∗1
j ≥ y∗1
j (1) = x∗1
j .
Hence, by the deﬁnition of single-peakedness,we have
y∗1(1)R∗1x∗1.
By repeating the same argument, we show that for all i =1 ,2,...,m,
y∗1(i)R∗1y∗1(i − 1).
Then,




i if and only if
(1) if x∗1
i >K i/2, then p∗1





i <K i/2, then p∗1
i <K i/2 and x∗1
i ≥ p∗1
i .





i >K i/2, then x∗2
i <K i/2.
If Ki/2 ≥ p∗1
i , then y∗1
i = Ki/2.Therefore, y∗1
i = Ki/2 <x ∗1
i , a contradiction.Hence,
p∗1













i <K i/2, then x∗2
i >K i/2.If p∗1
i ≥ Ki/2, then y∗1
i = Ki/2 >x ∗1
i , a contradic-
tion.Hence, p∗1











(b) Suﬃciency.Assume (1) and (2).
(i) If x∗1
i = Ki/2, then p∗1
i may take any value.Since x∗2




i >K i/2, then x∗2
i <K i/2 and p∗1














i <K i/2,x ∗2
i >K i/2 and p∗1














Lemma 4.3 If x∗1 = y∗1, then x∗1 = d1.










and let d2(0) = d2.For i =1 ,2,...,m, we want to show that
d2(i − 1)R∗2d2(i).




















i(i − 1) >d 2
i(i).
For all j ∈ J with j  = i,either
p∗2
j ≥ d2
j(i − 1) = d2
j(i)o rd2
j(i)=d2
j(i − 1) ≥ p∗2
j .
Hence, by the deﬁnition of single-peakedness, d2(i − 1)R∗2d2(i).
(b)If d2
















i(i − 1) ≥ p∗2
i .
10For all j ∈ J with j  = i,either
p∗2
j ≥ d2
j(i − 1) = d2
j(i)o rd2
j(i)=d2
j(i − 1) ≥ p∗2
j .
Hence, by the deﬁnition of single-peakedness, d2(i − 1)R∗2d2(i).
(c) If d2
i = Ki/2, then d2
i = x2
i.Hence, d2(i − 1) = d2(i).Then, d2(i − 1)R∗2d2(i).
CASE 2: x∗1
i >K i/2. (i.e., x∗2
i <K i/2.)
By Lemma 4.2, p∗1
i >K i/2.
If p∗2










i(i − 1) >d 2
i(i).
For all j ∈ J with j  = i,either
p∗2
j ≥ d2
j(i − 1) = d2
j(i)o rd2
j(i)=d2
j(i − 1) ≥ p∗2
j .
Hence, by the deﬁnition of single-peakedness, d2(i − 1)R∗2d2(i).

















i , then d2
i = Ki−p∗1
i . By Lemma 4.2, p∗1
i ≥ x∗1











i(i − 1) ≥ p∗2
i .
For all j ∈ J with j  = i,either
p∗2
j ≥ d2
j(i − 1) = d2
j(i)o rd2
j(i)=d2
j(i − 1) ≥ p∗2
j .
Hence, by the deﬁnition of single-peakedness, d2(i − 1)R∗2d2(i).
(b)If p∗2
i >K i − p∗1




j(i − 1) for all j ∈ J with j  = i,
d2
i(i − 1) = p∗2
i (i) implies that d2(i − 1)R∗2d∗2(i) by the deﬁnition of single-peakedness.
CASE 3: x∗1
i <K i/2. (i.e., x∗2
i >K i/2.)
By Lemma 4.2, p∗1
i <K i/2.
If Ki/2 ≥ p∗2










i(i − 1) ≥ p∗2
i .
For all j ∈ J with j  = i,either
p∗2
j ≥ d2
j(i − 1) = d2
j(i)o rd2
j(i)=d2
j(i − 1) ≥ p∗2
j .
11Hence, by the deﬁnition of single-peakedness, d2(i − 1)R∗2d2(i).


















i , then d2
i = Ki−p∗1














i(i − 1) ≥ d2
i(i).
For all j ∈ J with j  = i,either
p∗2
j ≥ d2
j(i − 1) = d2
j(i)o rd2
j(i)=d2
j(i − 1) ≥ p∗2
j .
Hence, by the deﬁnition of single-peakedness, d2(i − 1)R∗2d2(i).
(b) If p∗2





j(i − 1) for all j ∈ J with j  = i,
d2
i(i − 1) = p∗2
i (i) implies that d2(i − 1)R∗2d2(i) by the deﬁnition of single=peakedness.
From the results in Cases 1 to 3, we have
d2 = d2(0)R∗2d2(1)R∗2 ···R∗2d2(m)=x∗2.
Since x∗1  = d1 and x∗1 + x∗2 = d1 + d2 = K,x∗2  = d2.Hence, at least one of the above










,x ∗2R∗2d2, a contradiction.
QED
By Lemma 4.3, x∗1  = d1 implies that x∗1  = y∗1.Note that in the proof of Lemma
4.1, we proved the relations:
y∗1 = y∗1(m)R∗1y∗1(m − 1)R∗1 ···y∗1(1)R∗1y∗1(0) = x∗1.
Hence, the preference relation between y∗1 and x∗1 is strict.That is,
y∗1P∗1x∗1




cannot be chosen by Ψ(R∗1, ˜ R2), because
Ψ1(R∗1, ˜ R2)R∗1y∗1.Since x∗2 = p( ˜ R2), we have x∗2 ˜ P2Ψ2(R∗1, ˜ R2).On the other hand,
x∗2 =Ψ 2(R∗1,R ∗2).Hence,
Ψ2(R∗1,R ∗2)=x∗2 ˜ P2Ψ2(R∗1, ˜ R2).
This means that Mr.2 gains by telling a lie if his true preference is ˜ R2.This contradicts
strategy proofness.This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 2.
125 Cocluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that the generalized uniform rule is a most eﬃcient resource
allocation mechanism among all strategy-proof mechanisms.In other words, the gener-
alized uniform rule is a ”second best” solution in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms.
As a conclusion, we present some open questions and conjectures.
Since Theorem 2.2 was proved for economies with two agents and m goods, to extend
this theorem to economies with n agents and m goods is an interesting question.
However, there are some more open questions.That is, is the ”converse” of our
theorem true? To state this problem, let us introduce a deﬁnition.Consider economies
with n agents and m goods.Let N be the set of all agents.
Let Λ be a class of solutions deﬁned on Γn.
Deﬁnition 5.1 For any Φ ∈ Λ, a solution Φ is called to be Λ- eﬃcient, when
for any mechanism Ψ ∈ Λ, if
Ψk(R)RkΦk(R) for all R ∈ Γn and all k ∈ N,
then Ψ(R)=Φ ( R) for all R ∈ Γn.
Using this deﬁnition, what we proved in the present paper is that if n=2, then the
generalized uniform rule satisﬁes ΛSP-eﬃciency, where ΛSP is the set of all strategy-
proof mechanisms on Γn.
Since the dictatorial mechanism is strategy-proof and Pareto optimal, it also satisﬁes
ΛSP-eﬃciency.
Using the concept of Λ-eﬃciency, the ”converse” of our main theorem may be stated
as follow:
(1) Are the generalized uniform rule and the dictatorial rule only two ΛSP-eﬃcient solu-
tions? Or, are there other ΛSP-ﬃcient solutions?
(2) Is the generalized uniform rule the only one ΛSP-solution satisfying AN? Or, are
there any other ΛSP-eﬃcient solutions satisfying AN?
Finally, in Arrow and Debreu’s economies with nonsatiated preferences, we may state a
similar kind of question.As disucussed in Introduction, there are several impossibility
theorems insisting that there is a tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and strategy-proofness in
this kind of settings. 9 If we weaken the requirement of eﬃciency, we may have the
same kind of problems as disucussed in this paper.To investigate whether Λ SP -eﬃcient
mechanisms exist in Arrow and Debreu economies would be another interesting question.
9Hurwicz [2], Zhou [8], Serizawa [5], Serizawa and Weymark [6], and so on.
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